Perspectives on dialogue: Introduction to this special issue by Piwek, Paul
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Perspectives on dialogue: Introduction to this special
issue
Journal Item
How to cite:
Piwek, Paul (2006). Perspectives on dialogue: Introduction to this special issue. Research on Language and
Computation, 4(2-3) pp. 143–152.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© [not recorded]
Version: [not recorded]
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1007/s11168-006-9001-3
http://mcs.open.ac.uk/pp2464/rolc introduction final draft.pdf
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
Perspectives on Dialogue: Introduction to this
Special Issue
Paul Piwek
∗
Final draft version. Published version in Research on Language &
Computation, Feb 2006, Pages 1 - 10. Final text available from SpringerLink
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11168-006-9001-3.
Abstract
We briefly summarize the papers in this volume, draw attention to the
variety of perspectives that they bring to the subject of dialogue, identify
a number of common themes, and conclude with a discussion of directions
for further research.
1 Introduction
In many ways, dialogue is the primary setting of language use: it requires
no formal training, serves as a means of communication in all cultures, and
plays an important role during language acquisition. This has led a number
of researchers to propose that a general understanding of language processing
needs to start with the study of dialogue (Clark, 1996; Pickering and Garrod,
2004; this volume).
At the same time, dialogue is one of the most challenging topics in the study
of language. In particular, spoken dialogue lacks the tidiness of letters, essays
and other forms of written discourse. It more often than not involves non-
sentential utterances, hesitations and overlapping speech events. Perhaps even
more importantly, the ability to engage in a dialogue has been trumpeted as a
good indicator of general intelligent behaviour (Turing, 1950). In other words,
the capacity to engage in a dialogue could very well be AI-complete, i.e., employ
all the skills and abilities that constitute human-level intelligence.
The difficulty of isolating dialogue from other human skills and abilities sug-
gests that we cannot afford to study it from one single perspective. To do justice
to this insight, this special issue brings together recent work on dialogue which
approaches the subject from a variety of perspectives. The papers illustrate
that work under these different perspectives has a number of common underly-
ing themes and that connections are being forged that lead to fresh results.
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We hope that this issue will further stimulate cross-disciplinary research
into dialogue. In this respect, it is in the spirit of the annual workshops on the
Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue (semdial) and the sigdial workshops
on Discourse and Dialogue, which bring together researchers from a variety of
backgrounds to discuss recent development in dialogue research.1
2 The papers in this volume
Branigan’s paper investigates in what ways two-party dialogue differs frommulti-
party dialogue. For this purpose, she provides a thorough overview of empirical
findings for both two and multi-party dialogue. The overview includes findings
on the construction of common ground (covering both textual and situational
representations) and audience design. Branigan reaches the conclusion that any
differences between two and multi-party dialogue are quantitative rather than
qualitative. In both varieties of dialogue, participants actively try to bring about
a situation in which they “mutually believe that the parties have understood
what the contributor meant to a criterion sufficient for the current purposes”
(The Principle of Responsibility from Clark & Schaefer, 1987, p. 262).2 Brani-
gan points out that in two-party dialogues the criterion for understanding has
typically been higher than in multi-party dialogues for reasons that are inde-
pendent of the number of dialogue participants. In particular, most work on
two-party dialogue concerns task-oriented dialogues that require a high level
coordination between the interlocutors.
Kibble opens with a critique of mentalistic belief and intention-based ac-
counts of dialogue phenomena. Amongst other things, he identifies problems
with formalizations of the notion of belief in terms of normal modal logics. He
also notes that communicative actions can be ascribed to entities (e.g., corpo-
rations) that would normally not be considered capable of mental states. A
further problem for any intersubjective account of dialogue based on belief and
intention is that in communication agents are not necessarily sincere about their
beliefs and intentions. Thus it is difficult to provide an intersubjective report of
the beliefs and intentions that are entertained by dialogue participants. Kibble
proposes to discard the notions of belief and intention altogether in favour of
an account in terms of the normative framework that has been developed over
two decades by the philosopher Robert Brandom (Brandom, 1983; Brandom,
1994; Brandom, 2000). Kibble outlines such an account in which commitment
and entitlement are centre stage. Commitment concerns what an agent is com-
pelled to do whereas entitlement pertains to what it is reasonable for an agent
to maintain. Whereas an agent can be committed to incompatible propositions,
it is not possible to be entitled to such commitments. Using this normative
vocabulary, the outline of a characterization of a various dialogue acts (such as
1For further details on these workshop series, see http://cswww.essex.ac.uk/semdial/ and
http://www.sigdial.org/, respectively.
2The activity of bringing about such a mutual belief is called grounding. An early compu-
tational model of grounding can be found in Traum (1994).
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assert, endorse and challenge) is given.
Pickering and Garrod present a more detailed account of the notion of align-
ment in dialogue that they have extensively argued for in Pickering and Garrod
(2004). They contrast their approach with the information transfer model of
language use which emphasizes encoding of meaning by a speaker and subse-
quent decoding by a hearer. In Pickering and Garrod’s model, alignment is
not the result of such packing and unpacking of meaning, but the consequence
of a primitive priming mechanism. This mechanism is a form of automatic,
non-inferential imitation and operates on various levels of representation (e.g.,
lexical and syntactic). Furthermore, alignment on such lower levels gives rise to
alignment on the level of situational representations. During normal processing,
there is no appeal to higher level processes that involve negotiation between in-
terlocutors or explicit representation of each other’s mental states. Even repair
is thought of in mechanistic terms: if an utterance does not fit the current situa-
tional model, the first course of action for a hearer is to attempt a reformulation
compatible with their current situation model, and to see whether the speaker
agrees with it. Solutions that require explicit modeling of other participants’
beliefs are to be more costly (in terms of processing effort). Such alternative
solutions are normally only used if shallow mechanistic repair strategies have
failed. Pickering and Garrod illustrate various aspects of their model using an
example from a corpus of maze conversations.
Poesio, Patel and Di Eugenio use a corpus of tutorial dialogues to compare
two models of global focus in discourse: Grosz and Sidner’s stack model (Grosz
and Sidner, 1986) and Walker’s cache model (Walker, 1998). The corpus is
annotated in terms of Relational Discourse Analysis (RDA; Moser and Moore,
1996). They show how the theoretical constructs of both the stack and cache
model can be interpreted in terms of RDA. This then gives them a basis for
comparing the two models. The comparison is in terms of accessibility of an-
tecedents and ambiguity for pronouns and definite descriptions. For pronouns,
they find that the accessibility of the antecedent is not affected by varying the
model. This resonates with previous work which has also suggested that the
global focus has little to no effect on the interpretation of pronouns. In con-
trast, they do find that both accessibility and ambiguity are affected for definite
descriptions: changing the model does mean that an antecedent might be ruled
out (accessibility) or that a larger number of non-antecedents is put forward by
the model as candidates (ambiguity). The best cache model they tested does
better than the best stack model. They suggest that this might, however, be
an artefact of the annotation scheme (in particular, the absence of intentional
relations across speaker turns). For cache models, it turned out that cache size
matters: in particular, the standard size of 7 that was originally proposed does
not seem to be the most optimal one.
Purver presents a computational model of clarificatory exchanges in dialogue.
A prototype information state-based implementation (CLARIE) is described. It
deals with both user and system clarification and follows a classification scheme
for clarification requests (CRs) that was derived from a 150,000 word corpus of
general dialogue extracted from the British National Corpus (BNC) (Burnard,
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2000). The proposed model has a number of appealing aspects. Firstly, it deals
with a wider range of CR forms than is common in existing formal and com-
putational treatments of CRs. Secondly, CRs and their answers are treated as
regular ask and assertion moves, respectively (rather than, for example, special-
ized requests-for-clarifications). What distinguishes CRs from other ask moves
is not the type of dialogue act that is being performed, but rather the fact
that this act happens to concern a previous utterance. The paper should be
of general interest to anyone interested in building practical dialogue systems,
also, because the underlying idea that utterances can be modelled as contextual
abstracts that require a grounding process to become fully specified remains
largely neutral with respect to the underlying grammar formalism.
Purver, Cann and Kempson describe how their grammar formalism, Dy-
namic Syntax (Kempson et al., 2001), addresses the challenge posed by Pickering
and Garrod (2004; this volume) to provide an account for the basic processing
mechanisms in dialogue. The formalism is procedural in nature: parsing is
at the centre and no parsing-independent grammar is recognized. Rather, the
grammar consists of tree update actions that allow for word-by-word incremen-
tal construction of parse trees. A parse tree represents the predicate-argument
structure of an input sentence. Generation operates on the same tree structures
as parsing, but now the input is a goal tree. Generation consists of finding lexi-
cal actions –associated with words– that incrementally create a structure which
subsumes the goal tree. An important aspect of the approach is the introduction
of a context relative to which both parsing and generation operate. This context
makes it possible to re-use both preceding tree structure and tree update actions.
Such re-use is shown to account for a range of linguistic phenomena including
bare answers, shared utterances and ellipsis. Alignment is shown to be a natural
consequence of context re-use. Crucially, re-use is shown to reduce processing
costs. This provides a further motivation for lexical and syntactic alignment in
dialogue in addition to Pickering and Garrod’s claim that alignment on lower
levels results in alignment on the level of situational representations.
3 Emergent Perspectives on Dialogue
The natural starting point for identifying different perspectives on dialogue is
the traditional organization of research into different fields. From this point
of view, the papers by Purver, Purver et al. and Poesio et al. can be seen as
belonging to Computional Linguistics; Branigan, and Pickering and Garrod, are
foremost studies in Psycholinguistics; and Kibble’s paper is on the borderline
between Analytical Philosophy/Logic and Computational Linguistics.
Such a division into fields of research gives us some indication of the specific
angles from which dialogue can be examined. For example, whereas in (com-
putational) linguistics the focus is on specific linguistic constructions, from an
AI perspective the main concern is typically shifted towards underlying lan-
guage independent mechanisms for communication, abstracting away from the
connection with the linguistic inventory of specific languages (see Purver, this
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volume for further discussion). However, on the whole, the existing divisions
are too crude for a systematic inventory of perspectives; they cut across various
dimensions and consequently bring with them the danger of ending up with a
classification of research into dialogue a bit like the classification of animals in
the infamous Chinese encyclopedia alluded to in Borges (1984): “(a) belonging
to the emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame [...] (k) drawn with a very fine camel
hair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from
a long way off look like flies.”.
In the following sections, we add to the common division into research fields
a number of mainly orthogonal dimensions of classification that should help us
to make the relations between the papers in this volume explicit.
3.1 Is versus Ought
A dialogue involves participants, and the behaviour of these participants con-
stitutes the dialogue. We can approach the study of such behaviour from two
different angles. From an empirical point of view, one can ask what the be-
haviour of human dialogue participants is like. Alternatively, one can look for
the norms that are implicit in this behaviour and shift the emphasis to the
question what the behaviour of dialogue participants ought to be like. In this
special issue, most papers tend to toward the point of view that asks what di-
alogue behaviour is like rather than what it ought to be like. Kibble’s paper is
an exception in that it does employ a normative vocabulary to specify dialogue
behaviour. The characterization of dialogue in normative terms, i.e., norms,
commitments, obligations, etc., can be traced back to the view of dialogue as
a type of game that is governed by rules that the interlocutors are expected
to follow.3 Such rules describe what participants ought to do, but do not nec-
essarily also specify how participants in fact act and even on occasion break
the rules. The relation between such a normative approach and the empiricist
point view is contentious. For example, the philosopher Robert Brandom pro-
poses that: “Cultural products and activities [including communicative acts in
dialogue] become explicit as such only by the use of normative vocabulary that
is in principle not reducible to the vocabulary of the natural sciences (though
of course the same phenomena under other descriptions are available in that
vocabulary).” (Brandom, 2000, p.33).
3.2 What versus How, and Who
Independent of the question whether certain behaviour is or ought to be pro-
duced in dialogue, one can ask the question how such behaviour is or can be
3The treatment of dialogue, and language use in general, as a type of game is usually
attributed to Wittgenstein (1953). Formalizations have been proposed by, amongst others,
Hamblin (1970), Bunt and Van Katwijk (1979) and Carlson (1983). More recent work on obli-
gations in dialogue by, for example, Matheson et al. (2000) introduces a normative vocabulary
into computational models of dialogue.
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produced. This move shifts the focus from describing observed or desirable pat-
terns of behaviour to uncovering underlying mechanisms that can generate such
behaviour. The question about the how allows for two alternative inpretations:
one can conceive of it as being focused on how humans produce dialogue be-
haviour or, alternatively, take a wider perspective and ask how agents (whether
human or not) can produce dialogue behaviour.
Of course, the distinction between research into the what of behaviour and
the how on the other side is not absolute; rather one can see them as opposite
extremes on a scale. Branigan, and Pickering and Garrod, put somewhat more
emphasis on the quest for empirical data on what behaviour humans produce,
whereas Purver and Purver et al. tend towards addressing specific how ques-
tions by providing detailed algorithmic specifications. The work of Poesio et
al. addresses both sides: the collection of empirical data and the use of these
to throw light on different theories of how language is processed. With regards
to the question of whose behaviour is being examined, Branigan, Pickering and
Garrod, and Purver et al., are primarily interested in the what and how of human
behaviour, whereas Poesio et al., Purver, and Kibble also concern themselves
with behaviour by non-human agents (computer programs).
3.3 Pure versus Applied
One can ask the aforementioned questions for their own sake, but also in the
context of specific applications. The distinction between pure and applied re-
search cuts across the questions regarding what, how, who and is versus ought.
From the point of view of applications, research into dialogue is relevant to
human–human dialogue, human–machine dialogue and machine–machine dia-
logue. In this volume, the issue of applications for human–human dialogue is
not addressed, i.e., the research on dialogue for helping humans communicate
better with each other, whether it is with or without the help of technology.
The technology-based enhancement of human-human dialogue is the subject of
the field of computer-mediated communication (see, e.g., Herring, in press).
A number of papers in this volume are concerned with issues resulting from
applications in the area of human–computer dialogue. Purver explicitly moti-
vates his research into clarification requests by pointing out that as dialogue
systems “start dealing with more complex tasks and domains, [...] the scope
for various misunderstandings increases” and as result there is “an advantage
to being able to clarify at the individual word or phrase level, making the user
aware of the specific source of the problem”.
Interestingly, Purver’s work also illustrates the tension that sometimes exist
between pure and applied research into dialogue. From the point of view of cur-
rent applications, Purver’s work on addressing clarification requests regarding
unknown words is inspired by human behaviour, but difficult to interface with
existing speech recognizers which given an input guess which known words it
matches, ignoring the possibility that the input is an unknown word.
Although Poesio et al. are primarily concerned with comparing two theoret-
ical accounts of discourse structure and anaphora, they also bring into consider-
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ation practical differences between these accounts. In particular, they point out
that one of the models under investigation (the cache model) is much easier to
implement than the other (the stack model), because the former does not depend
the recognition of intentions (which are notoriously difficult to recognize).
Finally, Kibble draws attention to the relevance of foundational work on
protocols and update rules for dialogue to the semantics of practical languages
for inter-agent communication languages (e.g., KQML; Finin et al., 1997).
3.4 Differences in Method
The methods that are used in each of the papers in this volume range from em-
pirical (experimental and corpus-based) to computational and analytical. The
work of Branigan, and Pickering and Garrod, is primarily a discussion of em-
pirical work, whereas some aspects of this work are formalized and framed in
computational terms in Purver and Purver et al. Poesio et al. use a corpus
and automated processing of the corpus to compare two alternative theoretical
accounts of global focus. Kibble approaches dialogue through analytical means,
examining different foundational assumptions for modelling dialogue.
From the point of view of this journal, the computational approach is of
particular importance. We want to emphasize that computational approaches
have merits beyond their obvious potential for applications in dialogue systems.
One of the pioneers of research on dialogue using computers, Richard Power,
has put it as follows:
“There are two main reasons why computer models are used [in the-
oretical psychology]. First, they give quick accurate feedback on
the coherence, completeness, and detailed consequences of a theory.
Theories of cognitive processes are necessarily complicated, and are
likely to be too complicated for the unaided human intelligence to
cope with. Second, computer models are an appropriate medium of
expression for a theorist who believes that the mind is a computa-
tional system. Even theorists who don’t write programs have found
computational concepts useful (see Neisser, 1967).” (Power, 1979,
p.109)
4 Trends and Outlook
The papers in this volume suggest a number of trends in current research on
dialogue. A common theme in Pickering and Garrod, Purver, and Purver et
al., is the emphasis on low level mechanisms that are at play in dialogue and
which require no explicit modelling of higher level beliefs and intentions.4 Kib-
ble questions the use of belief and intentions for modelling dialogue from a
4Others have suggested that although some notion of belief, intention and desire are re-
quired, there is no need for computationally intractable planning to arrive at complex dialogue
structure. See, e.g., Beun (2001).
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different angle, arguing that Brandomian commitments and entitlement should
replace them as a more solid, intersubjective basis. Recently, Robert Brandom’s
work seems to have gained some influence in the community of researchers con-
cerned with modelling language use, as witnessed by a special issue of Pragmat-
ics and Cognition dedicated to Brandom’s Inferentialism (Stekeler-Weithofer,
2005). Proof and model-theoretic commitment-based analyses of dialogue have
also been proposed by, for example, Piwek (1998; 2000) to deal with various
phenomena in dialogue.
There is also a clear trend away from armchair examples to the use of corpora
of naturally occurring dialogue. Furthermore, the availability of large quantities
of corpus-based data suggests that there is potential for the automated acqui-
sition of regularities in dialogue (e.g., by means of machine learning). Purver
points out that automation is necessary for extending coverage to new domains
and languages.
Let us conclude this introduction by highlighting a few directions for fur-
ther research. Firstly, in the future, empirical research into the how of human
dialogue behaviour will hopefully get new data from neurophysiological studies.
These are currently still limited to isolated production tasks (see Roelofs, 2004
for an overview), but further technological developments should, in the future,
make it possible to obtain information on how the brain processes information
during dialogue.
The work by Pickering and Garrod on alignment as grounded in imitation
strongly suggests that low-level non-verbal signals also play an important role
in achieving alignment of situational representations. This requires further re-
search into the integrated use in dialogue of verbal and non-verbal means (see,
e.g., Nakano et al., 2003 ). From the point of view of applications, this is an area
which has recently gained interest in the context of the construction of Embodied
Conversational Agents that is, computer-animated characters that can engage
in a dialogue with a user or other computer-animated characters (e.g., Cassell
et al., 2000; Prendinger and Ishizuka, 2004). Others have taken up the even
more challenging task of constructing robots that can engage in dialogue (e.g.,
Bos et al., 2003).
Finally, the emphasis on low-level processes in dialogue behaviour leads to
models that are more concerned with the central place of emotion and feelings
in dialogue behaviour (See Damasio, 1999 regarding the revival of emotions in
psychology and Andre´ et al, 2004 for work on affective dialogue systems).
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